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The　Balance　Sheets　of　Central　Banks　：　The　Effects　of
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Expansion
Yutaka　Kurihara
　　This　paper　presents　a　theoretical　and　empirical　analysis　ofthe　effects　ofbalance　sheet
expansion　ofcentral　banks．　Bank　ofJapan，　for　example，　has　expanded　its　balance　sheet
greatly，　On　the　surface，　there　seem　to　be　no　problems　with　balance　sheet　expansion　；
however，　on　closer　examination，　there　may　be　some　serious　problems．　Central　bankS
should　adhere　strictly　to　their　roles　and　missions．　Under　severe　economic　oonditions　in
developed　countries，　central　banks　should　take　part　in　forrnulating　economic　policy，　buts
this　can　confer　problems　on　the　financial　institutions．　Structural　reform　is　needed　to
improve　financial　and　monetary　systems．　For　Japanese　banks，　a　common　problem　that
should　be　given　priority　for’developing　sqlutions　is　bad　loans．　JEL　：　F3．
1．　Introduction
　　Central　banks　always　see　their　balance　sheet．　Most　economists　agree　that．it　is　critical
to　maintain　the　credibility　of　banks’　balance　sheets．　This　credibility　is　related　to　the
stability　ofthe　financial　systern　and　the　effectiveness　ofmacroeconomic　policy．
　　For　some　ofthe　central　banks　in　developed　counnies，　the　scales　ofbalance　sheets　have
increased　gradually．　Bank　of　Japan　in　particul．ar　has　rapidly　increased　the　scale　of　its
balance　sheet　such　that　it　is　now　almost　six　times　gr’?≠狽?秩@than　it　was　20　years　ago．　The
reasons　for　this　jncrease，　as　regards　liability，　are　that　checking　account　volumes　increase
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following　the　increase　ofthe　money　supply　under　severe　economic　conditions，　and　the
increase　of　bank　notes　during　periods　of　low　interest　rates．　From　the　view　of　assets，
national　bonds　and　bills　of　the　Bank　of　Japan　have　increased　due　to　the　money　supply’s
increase．　These　increases　have　prompted　the　Bank　of　Japan　to　buy　a　lot　of　stocks．
Economists　need　to　consider　carefully　the　consequences　of　such　trends　and　decisions．
　　This　paper　analyzes　problems　associated　with　this　situation．　The　following　section
provides　an　analysis　considerations　regarding　balance　sheet　for　central　banks．　New
trends　that　impact　balance　sheets　are　discussed　and　the　conclusion　that　follows　addresses
both　of　these　arenas．
2．　What　shall　central　banks　do？
　　The　roles　of　central　banks　vary　from　country　to　country．　There　are，　however，　some
common　characteristics　：　soundness，　neutrality，　and　liquidity．　The　relation　of　these’to
balance　sheets　is　discussed　below．
Soundness
　　Assets　ofcentral　banks　should　be　highly　credible．　Deterioration　ofthe　soundness　of
central　banksl　assets　may　result　in　significant　direct　losses，　with　the血rther　indirect　effect
of　losses　of　revenues　of　nations．
Neutrality
　　Central　banks　should　not　engage　in　activities　that　may　cause　fluctuation　in　the　prices
of　each　asset．　lf　centrai　banks　at：e　heavily　invested　in　specific　assets，　it　can　affect　the
balance　ofresource　allocation，　for　example　through　price　changes．
Liquidity
　　Central　banks　have　to　respond　to　economic　cohditions　adequately　and　speedily．　To
accomplish　this，　the　assets　of　central　banks　should　be　highly　liquid．　Central　banks，
because　of　their　capacity　to　create　domestic　liquidity，　are　generally・deemed　reliable
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obligators　in　their　own　currency　and　hence　do　not　appear　to　nee．d　capital　as　a　guarantee
for　borrowing．　ln　fact，　in　most　cases，　payment　finality　is　defined　as　receipt　of　central
bank　money　either　as　bank　notes　or　as　deposits．
　　This　is　not　to　deny　that　there　is　a　limit　to　the　real　resources　that　can　be　obtained　by
central　banks．　The　implicit　limit　is　expressed　by　the　possibility　ofthe　market　indirectly
constraining　the　central　bank，　in　the　extreme　by　refusing　to　transact　in　and　demand
domestic　monetary　base．　Liquidity　is　a　vital　characteristic　ofcentral　banks．
3．　New　Trends　of　Central　Banks
Theoretical　Analysis
　　Recently，　central　banks’　balance　sheets　have　undergone　rapid　change．　・The　scale　has
expanded　rapidly，　and　worry　about　capital　deterioration　has　resulted．　What　problems
are　associated　with　these　changes？　Do　central　banks　need　capital？
　　Surelys　some　people　say　that　central　banks　need　not　have　capital　because　they　are
inherently　profitable．　The　United　States　and　Canada　are　typical　examples．　Capital
inj　ection　is　possible　and　increases　government　interest　revenue．　Also，　with　increased
interest　rates，　central　banks　gain　profit　from　issuing　money．
　．However，　great　problems　can　resuit　from　implementation　ofthese　approaches．　Long－
term　interest　rate　increases　as　a　result　ofissuing　ofgovemment　bonds　causes　cap’奄狽≠戟@loss．
Because　yields　on　govemment　bonds　are　currently　so　low，　these　holdings　expose　the
central　banks’　balance　sheets　to　considerable　interest－rate　risk　and　thereby　weaken　the
institutionai　positions　ofthe　central　banks．　M
　　Central　banks　losses　become　a　problem　when　they　interfere　with　the　conduct　of
monetary　policy　（Folkerts－Landau　＆　Garber，　1996）．　The　decrease　of　capital　makes　it
impossible　for　central　banks　to　subscribe　to　prudent　poiicy．　Strengthening　ofthe　central
banks’　capital　base　is　rieeded　to　allow　them　to　pursue　more　aggressive　easing　ofmonetary
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policy．　（2）
　　Losses　may　lead　either　to　an　injection　of　reserve　money，　if　in　cash，　or　ported　future
cash　injections　ifthey　are　．unrealized．　Such　losses　may　either　impact　domestic　liquidity
or　influence　expectations　about　future　monetary　growth　（Sargent　and　Wallace，　1981）．
The　reserve　injection　is　consistent　with　the　monetary　program，　however，　manY　problems
are　associated　with　this　approach，　The　central　bank　will　need　to　offer　the　market　assets
from　its　own　portfolio　bearing　market　returns　in　exchange　fot　reserve　rr！oney．　However，
this　produces　further　operational　expenses　or　loss　of　reserve．　The　second　method　is　to
issue　the　central　bank’s　own　liabilities．　This，　however，　creates　the　risk　of　the　central
bank　accumulating　an　unsustainable　debt　burden．　The　third　problem　is　related　to　the
government．　lf　the　governments　cover　losses　through　transfers　from　the　treasury　of
government　debt，　those　could　be　used　to　sterilize　the　monetary　inj　ection．　The　treasury
should　be　flexible　so　that　it　can．provide　or　issue　an　indefinite　amount　of　securities　to　the
central　bank．
　　The　weakness　of　financial　conditions　in　central　banks　may　influence　the　independence
of　govemment．　Central　banks　in　developed　countries　have　the　independence　of
government　（Stella，　1997）．　lf　the　income　of　central　banks　is　too　low　to　support　their
current　expenditure　budget，　dentral　banks　might　be　forced　to　ask　the　Ministry　ofFinance
for　supplemental　funds，　which　the　central　banks　might　fear　would　put　their　independence
at　risk．
　　Inflation　may　occur　under　bad　financial　conditions．　Some　counter－arguments，　of
course，　are　possible．　The　debtor　countries　are　not　always　in　inflationary　cycles．　lnflation
has　a　lot　of　c’≠浮唐?刀D　The　relationship　between　inflation　and　balance　sheet　expansion　is
not　clear．　Over－debt　or　balance　sheet　expansion　is　not　the　only　reason　for　inflation．　Some
developing　countries，　such　as　Chile　and　lndonesia，　have　not　suffered　not　high　inflation
in　spite　ofthe　fact　that　their　central　banks　are　over－debt．　（3）　However，　・　in　countries　with
over－debt　conditions，　central　banks　cannot　engage’in　buying　operations　needed　to　avoid
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inflation　（Eichengreen　and　Garber，　1999）．
One　Empirical　Analysis
　　Deterioration　of　the　balance　sheet　can　be　associated　with　serious　problems．　This
section　uses　using　empirical　methods　to　analyze　the　scale　of　balance　sheets　of　central
banks　in　Japan　and　the　U．　S．　The　method　is　simple　OLS．　The　scale／GDP　is　regressed
by　constant　temi　and　infiation　rate．　Central　banks　in　developed　countries　have　made
stable　prices　a　priority　goal．　Along　with　independence　from　government，　this　movement
has　become　the　world　trend．　The　result　is　as　follows．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Table
Regression　Analysis　for　Scale　of　Balance　Sheet
japan United　States
1980－19891990－20021980－1989 1990－2002
Constant
Inflation　rate
　　　　　つA（ij，　R」
F－statistic
D．W．
12．84
（19．51）
一〇．54＊
（Ll．41）
　O．17
　2．00
2，00
18，08
（7．00）
一3．32＊＊
（一1，65）
　O．20
　2．71
　0．90
　7．17
（18．87）
一〇．51＊＊＊
（一3．84）
　O．73
14．76
　2．51
　8．45
（19．82）
HO，89＊＊＊
（一5，23）
　e．67
27．33
　124
（　）　is　the　value　oftstatistics．＊＊＊is　significant　at　l％，＊＊is　so／o，　and＊is工0％．
The　results　are　interesting　and　clear．First，both　monetary　authorities　took　counter－cyclical
measures　in　the　1980s　and　since　that　period．　Second，Bank　ofJapan　has　expanded　balance
sheet　greatly　and　the　rate　ofbalance　sheet　versus　GDP　is　high　compared　to　that　of　other
Countries．　（‘）
4．　Conclusion
　　Balance　sheets　of　central　banks　are　and　should　be　important　as　reliable　indicators　of
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the　financial　condition　ofthe　countries．　｛S）　Central　banks　may　operate　well　without　capital
as　conventionally　defined．　However，　a　large　negative　net　Worth，　for　example，　is　likely
to　interfere　with　banks’　abilities　to　attain　their　obj　ectives．　This　is　the　most　important
point．
　　The　central　banks’　holding　weight　ofnational　bond　and　stock　are　important．　Ofcourse，
ifdeflation　continues，　stock　holdings　would　cause　loss；and　ifdefiation　does　not　continue，
national　bond　holdings　would　not　cause　loss．　However，　excess　holding　is　dangerous．　ln
Japan，　fears　that　the　bank　might　shift　its　financial　firepower　from　buying　government
bonds　to　purchasing　stocks　triggered　a　minor　panic　in　spite　ofthe　fact　that　it　fueled　rising
stock　prices　ofbanks．　The　idea　ofshoring　up　the　banks’　balance　sheets　so　they　can　focus
on　eleaning　up　their　bad　loans　is　much　more　important．　This　is　an　essential　way　to　ensure
a　sound　financial　and　economic　system．
Notes
（1）Any　Iosses　would　be　partly　offi…et　by　unrealized　capital　ga孟皿s　on　earlier　acquisitions　of　bonds．　The
　Bank　of　Japan　has　reserves　for　possible　losses　on　securities　and　foreign　exchange　transactions　and　is
permitted　by　the　Article　53　of　the　Bank　of　Japan　law　to　retain　50／o　of　the　surplus　from　the　settlement
of　profits　and　losses　as　a　reserve　fund．　Berrianke　（2003）　proposed　that　the　Ministry　of　Finance
　convert　the　fixed　interest　rates　ofthe　Japanese　gevernment　bonds　held　by　the　Bank　ofJapan　into　floa－
　ting　interest　rates．　This　would　protect　the　capital　position　ofthe　Bank　ofJapan　from　increases　in　long－
　term　interest　rates　and　remoye　much　ofthe　balance　sheet　risk　that　is　associated　with　open－market　op－
　era“ons　m　government　securltles．
（2）　The　Federal　Reserve，　the　Bank　ofCanada，　and　the　Bundesbank　could　well　operate　with　zero　capital
　without　any　material　impact　on　their　policies　or　profitability　However，　again，　central　banks　cannot
operate　effectively　with　arbitrarily　large　negative　net　worth　or　under　conflicting　constraints．
（3）　However，　there　is　high　probability　that　fiscal　policy　or　IMF’s　program　made　it　possible　for　them　to
　avoid　infiation，
（4）　At　the　end　of2002，　the　balance　sheet　rate　against　nominal　GDP　in　each　country　was　Bank　ofJapan，
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　25，00／o；ECB，　10．60／o；FRB，　6，20／e；Bank　ofEngland，　4．70／o；and　Bank　of　Canada，　3．90／o．
（5）　Proper　accounting　practice　in　deterrnining　central　bank　profit　or　loss　and　ruies　governing　the　transfer
　ofthe　central　bank’s　status　to　the　treasury　are　also　important，
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